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REPUBLICANISM AND THE LAW OF INHERITANCE 
IN THE AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY ERAt 
Stanley N. Katz* 
Perspicuity and precision are the only things endeavoured at: the 
subject is incapable of ornament. 
William Blackstone, A Treatise on 
the Law of Descents in Fee-Simple 
(Oxford, 1759) 
However great may be the advantage of enjoying a rich patri-
mony, handed down to us from father to son, in general, industry 
and knowing how to get on in the world are worth more to young 
men than inherited property. 
Moral, Puss in Boots 
This Article deals with the history of the law of inheritance during 
the era of the American Revolution, but its focus is actually more 
general, for it ultimately seeks to determine what sort of revolution 
we experienced. For the historian the problem is quite familiar, but 
a few observations seem pertinent. It is at least possible to argue 
that our colonial forefathers were not waging a revolution at all. 
Rather, one might say they were fighting what we should now call 
a colonial war of independence in which the overriding issue was 
"home rule." On this hypothesis, the m~,in slogan of the 1760's, "No 
taxation without representation," captures the basic issue, and the 
Battle of Yorktown (and the Treaty of Paris) define an end point 
for "the Rebellion." To most historians this seems an excessively 
narrow interpretation, but it ill-behooves those who have witnessed 
the violent progress of recent history to minimize the desire for 
national self-definition and self-government. 
t This Article is based on the author's Thomas M. Cooley Lecture at The Uni-
versity of Michigan Law School, delivered on November 3, 1975. 
I am grateful to Dean St. Antoine and his colleagues at The University of Michi-
gan Law School for the opportunity to deliver one of the Thomas M. Cooley Lectures 
for 1975. In preparing and revising the lecture, I have been .aided by my former 
research assistants, Professor Martha Fineman of the University of Wisconsin Law 
School and Professor Paul Finkelman of Washington University, St. Louis. I also 
wish to express gratitude to Gerhard Casper, Whitmore Gray, Thomas Green, and 
John Langbein for their helpful comments. For this Article, as for my other work, 
I am indebted to the critical colleagueship of Morton Horwitz and William Nelson. 
* Professor of Legal History and Associate Dean, The University of Chicago 
Law School. A.B. 1955, M.A. 1959, Ph.D. 1961, Harvard University.-Ed. 
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It is possible, however, to construct a far more complex version 
of the "war for independence" theory, arguing that the need for in-
dependence grew not so much out of reaction to imperial distance 
and governmental excess as out of a radical transformation in 
America of ideas about politics. This view has the advantage of dis-
tinguishing our rebellion from those of the contemporary Third 
World, a distinction made necessary by the contrasting origins of the 
American colonists and the peoples of India, the Belgian Congo, or 
Algeria. Unlike these subjugated indigenous peoples, the Ameri-
cans were natives to the culture of their imperial rulers, and the ap-
peal of self-determination is probably too simplistic to explain why 
such people opted for the trauma of war and the uncertainties of 
independence. 
There is a third hypothesis, suggested to historians by the Pro-
gressive politics of the early twentieth century, which posits that the 
struggle for home rule was accompanied by a contest over who should 
rule at home. It maintains that the internal revolution of American 
vefi!US American caused the external revolution of Americans versus 
British. The theory has taken a good many different forms, but in 
general it insists that the Revolution represents the overturning of 
the quasi-aristocratic social and political order the imperial system 
had created and supported in America. The Revolution is thus seen 
~ the product of an alliance consisting of the newly emergent mer-. 
chant class, the mass of petty agrarians, and the urban workers, all 
of whom had been systematically excluded from access to power in 
colonial society. The corollary to this theory is that once the alliance 
produced a democratic revolution (expressed in the rhetoric of the 
Declaration), the monied classes staged a successful counterrevolu-
tion against their former allies in the late 1780's, resulting in the Con-
stitution of 1787-1788.1 
This is not the place to attempt an evaluation of these confli9t-
ing interpretations of the Revolution, but I trust they suggest both the 
wide range of possible views and, more important, the contemporary 
significance of which view we take. In rethinking the character of 
the Revolution, one of the most promising strategies involves an in-
1. See B. BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 
(1967); M. JENSEN, THE FOUNDING OF A NATION (1968); G. WOOD, THE CREATION 
OF THE AMERICAN REPUBUC 1776-1787 (1969); THE REINTERPRETATION OF THE 
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 1763-1789 (J. Greene ed. 1968), especially Greene's intro• 
ductory essay, The Reappraisal of the American Revolution in Recent Historical 
Literature, in id. at 2. 
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quiry into the manner by which the institution of law affec_ted the 
progress of the Revolution and was affected by it. The concept and 
institution of property are central to the inquiry, for, in any hypoth-
esis of the causes of the Revolution, the character and control of 
property are central themes. Curiously, the subject of property has 
seldom been singled out for study by historians of the Revolution, 
although at the moment there seems to be a significant body of as 
yet unpublished writing on the problem. 2 Rather than try to antici-
pate this important addition to the literature, this Article singles out 
for inspection one small aspect of the institution-the law of testate 
and intestate succession-in the hope that it will suggest the 
potential rewards of the larger inquiry. 
Intuitively, the question of inheritance is central to the concep-
tion of property. Moreover, the law of inheritance represents a 
major intersection of public and private law. In the study of revolu-
tion, the law of inheritance may serve as a touchstone measuring the 
depth of revolutionary transformation in a society. When revolu-
tionary ideals overreach deeply embedded sentiments on matters of 
importance to individuals, the ideology inevitably succumbs, as, in 
one famous example, the Bolsheviks discovered in their futile effort 
to abolish inheritance shortly after taking power.3 
2. Among the unpublished work one must emphasize the Ph.D. dissertation of P. 
Lucas, Essays in the Margin of Blackstone's Commentaries (Princeton, 1963). The 
American theory of property is considered in J. Nedelsky, Property and the Framers 
of the United States Constitution: A Study of the Political Thought of James Madi-
son, Gouverneur Morris, and James Wilson (Ph. D. dissertation, University of Chi-
cago, 1977). ' 
Morton J. Horwitz and Harry N. Scheiber have also published essays dealing with 
aspects of the problem. See Horwitz, The Transformation in the Conception of 
Property in American Law, 1780-1860, 40 U. Cm. L. REV. 248 (1973); Scheiber, The 
Road to Munn-Eminent Domain and the Concept of Public Purpose in the State 
Courts, 5 PERSPECTIVES AM. HIST. 329 (1971). See also W. NELSON, THE AMERI-
CANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAw (1975); F. McDonald, The Taking Issue: A Con-
stitutional Perspective (Historical Background to 1791) (Unpublished Paper, Octo-
ber 1976). For the most comprehensive example of the significance of the study 
of inheritance in the fields of anthropology, history, and sociology, see FAMILY AND 
INHERITANCE: RURAL SocIETY IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1200-1800 (J. Goody, J. Thirsk 
& E.P. Thompson eds. 11976), especially Cooper, Patterns of Inheritance and Settle-
ment by Great Landowners from the Fifteenth to the Eighteenth Centuries, in id. at 
192; Goody, Inheritance, Property and Women: Some Comparative Considerations, 
in id. at 10; Kiernan, Private Property iti History, in id. at 361. · 
3. In 1918, the new Soviet government promulgated a law providing that all prop-
erty would revert to the state upon the death of its owner. However, the lack of 
an adequate apparatus to enforce the law and subsequent "interpretations" that sig-
nificantly limited its application quickly reduced the law to a mere "declaratory state-
ment." See 1 V. GsovsKI, SoVIET CML LAw 624-25 (1948). Later efforts to re-
strict the descent of wealth by imposing a maximum allowable inheritable estate and 
by levying progressive estate taxes were equally ineffective. See id. at 627-28. In 
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The American revolutionaries never proposed to pursue such a 
radical course; nevertheless, their rhetoric often seemed to call for 
thorough reform of the law of inheritance. After setting forth the 
historical and theoretical framework for discussion of inheritance in 
the late eighteenth century, this Article examines the course of legis-
lative reform and the proposals advanced in America and Europe 
by leading spokesmen of republican ideals, the revolutionary ideology 
of the era. By comparing the ideological doctrine with the actual 
results obtained, this Article hopes to contribute to 'OUr understanding 
of the character of the American Revolution. 
I. THE THEORETICAL FOUNDATION OF INHERITANCE 
The context of the problem will perhaps ·be more apparent if we 
first examine the intellectual justifications for the concept of in-
heritance and then examine the Anglo-American legal tradition. 
Broadly speaking, two sorts of justification for the law of inheritance 
have been advanced: one is derived from the Romano-medieval 
natural rights tradition, and the other emerged out of modem-that 
is, eighteenth century-conceptions of popular sovereignty and legal 
positivism. 
Hugo Grotius is perhaps the best known of the post-medieval 
continental advocates of the natural rights position. In his great 
work De jure belli ac pacis libri tres, written in 1648, Grotius argued 
that the right to transmit property by will follows from the natural 
order of things. "Though in fact a will," Grotius wrote, "as other 
a,cts, can take a definite form in accordance with municipal law, 
nevertheless in its essential character it is related to ownership, and, 
if we grant that, it belongs to the law of nature."4 In his view, the 
rules of intestate succession obtain legitimacy by virtue of their cor-
respondence with the presumed intention of decedents in a state of 
nature: 
Aside from all positive law, intestate succession, as it is called, after 
ownership has been established, has its origin in natural inference as 
to the wishes of the deceased. Since the force of ownership was such 
that it could be transferred to another at the will of the owner, so 
also in case of retention of ownership at the time of death . . . if 
1948, Gsovski asserts, there was "no limitation on the value of an inheritance in So-
viet Russia. A governmental fee is collected for the issuance of inheritance certifi-
cates. The scale is progressive and the highest rate is 10 per cent." Id. at 628-29. 
For a typical American casebook account of the Soviet experiment, see J. DUKB· 
MINIER, JR, & S. JOHANSON, FAMILY WEALTH TRANSACTIONS 51-53 (1972), 
4. 2 H. GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS LIBRI TRES 265 (F. Kelsey trans. 
1925). 
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any one had given no indication of his wishes, nevertheless, since it 
was not credible that his intention was to yield his property after his 
death to the first who would take it over, the inference is that his 
property is to belong to the person to whom it is especially probable 
that the dead man had wished that it should belong. 5 
5 
But of course it was Locke who, in his First Treatise, written 
in 1689, gave the classic English account of the natural rights argu-
ment. According to Locke, "[i]f anyone had began, and made him-
self a Property in any particular thing," here referring to his labor 
theory of value, "that thing, that possession, if he dispos'd not other-
wise of it by his positive Grant, descended Naturally to his Children, 
and they had a right to succeed to it, and possess it."6 Locke recog-
nized-that the right of children to take such property was not self-
evident, especially as natural resources ( "the Creatures" in Locke's 
term) used by a person should return, upon his death, to the 
common stock of society. He rejected the easy answer that "com-
mon consent hath disposed of it, to the Children" for although "Com-
mon Practice" does indeed so provide, nevertheless 
the common consent of Mankind . . . hath never been asked, nor 
actually given: and if common tacit Consent hath establish'd it, it 
would make it but a positive and not a Natural Right of Children 
to Inherit the Goods of their Parents: But where the Practice is Uni-
versal, tis reasonable to think the Cause is Natural. 7 
Locke found the true reason in the interlocking natural principles 
of self-preservation and procreation. Reproduction fulfills the 
human instincts to propagate the species and to achieve an immortal-
ity. But since children are incapable of maintaining themselves, their 
parents have an obligation, and an instinctual urge, to provide fdr 
their sustenance and comfort. To Locke, the principle of procrea-
tion "gives Children a Title, to share in the Property of their Parents, 
and a Right to Inherit their Possession."8 Locke even went so far 
as to say that children actually shared in the title to their parents' 
property: 
Men are not Proprietors of what they have meerly for themselves, 
their Children have a Title to part of it, and have their Kind of Right 
joyn'd with their Parents, in the Possession which comes to be wholly 
theirs, when death having put an end to their Parents use of it, hath 
taken them from their Possessions, and this we call Inheritance.9 
5. Id. at 269. 
6. J. LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT § 87, at 224 (P. Laslett ed. 1960). 
1. Id. § 88, at 224. 
8. Id. § 88, at 224-25. 
9. Id. § 88, at 225. 
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This natural rights justification for inheritance, with its deeply 
ingrained respect for private property rights and the familial organ-
ization of society, has always had an intuitive appeal in Anglo-
American culture, and the theory has occasionally emerged in 
modern case law. The most famous example is doubtless the 1906 
statement of the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Nunnemacher v. 
State, 10 in which the court held an inheritance tax unconstitutional 
because it abridged the natural rights tradition as expressed in the 
Declaration of Independence and the Wisconsin constitution. The 
court declared that "there are inherent rights existing in the people 
prior to the making of any of our constitutions," that such rights are 
not specifically defined "but are included under the very general 
terms of 'life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness,'" and that the 
pursuit of happiness "[u]nquestionably" comprehends "the acquisi-
tion of private property."11 By the court's definition, the right to 
acquire property includes a subsidiary right ~o dispose of it at death: 
"[T]here is planted in the breast of every person the desire to 
possess something useful or something pleasing which will serve to 
render life enjoyable, which shall be his very own, and which he may 
dispose of as he chooses, or leave to his children or his dependents 
at his decease."12 Such a natural right to effect one's testamentary 
desires, the Wisconsin court thought, "has been the controlling idea 
of the race, the supposed goal of earthly happiness," and "the right 
of the descendents, or some of them, to succeed to the ownership 
has been recognized from the dawn of human history."13 The court 
had a little more difficulty in demonstrating the naturalness of the 
right to dispose of property by w.µl, but it asserted the right in any 
case and warned that, in the absence of such a right, legislatures 
could abolish the right of inheritance, thereby turning "every fee-
simple title into a mere estate for life, and thus, in effect, confiscate 
the property of the people once every generation. "14 
Nunnemacher is, however, an isolated moment in the history of 
American jurisprudence, for the mainstream of our tradition is 
clearly marked by the positivist spirit of Blackstone and the theorists 
of legislative sovereignty. Blackstone explained the basis of inherit-
ance in the first chapter of the second book of his Commentaries 
10. 129 Wis. 190, 108 N.W. 627 (1906). 
11. 129 'Wis. at 200, 108 N.W. at 629. 
12. 129 Wis. at 200, 108 N.W. at 629. 
13. 129 Wis. at 201, 108 N.W. at 62~. 
14. 129 Wis. at 202, 108 N.W. at 630. 
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on the Law of England15 and flatly denied the natural rights theory: 
We are apt to conceive at first view that it has nature on it's side; 
yet we often mistake for nature what we find established by long and 
inveterate custom. It is certainly a wise and effectual, but clearly 
a political, establishment; since the permanent right of property, 
vested in the ancestor himself, was no natural, but merely a civil, 
right.10 
7 
Blackstone argued that natural-law theory suggests. that "on the 
death of the possessor the estate should again become common,"17 
that it should revert to its natural state and thereby be available to 
the first occupant and user. But any such process would, in his view, 
lead to enormous discord in a perpetual rush to lay claim to the prop-
erties of the recently deceased, and it was therefore "for the sake 
of civil peace" that society began to order inheritance •by legislation. 
Thus 
the universal law of almost every nation (which is a kind of second-
ary law of nature) has either given the dying person a power of con-
tinuing his property, by disposing of his possessions by will; or, in 
case he neglects to dispose of it, or is not permitted to make any dis-
position at all, the municipal law of the country then steps in, and 
declares who shall be the successor, representative or heir of the 
deceased; that is, who alone shall have a right to enter upon this va-
cant possession, in order to avoid that confusion which it's becoming 
again common would occasion.18 
That the positivist tradition ran deep in America is suggested by 
the manner in which James Otis, no stranger to the siren song of 
natural rights, developed the positivist argument in defending primo-
geniture in a Massachusetts litigation of 1763. Otis asserted that 
"[t]he Manner of Succession, if traced to its Original, is merely arbi-
trary. . . . States have an undoubted Right to settle it as they 
please."19 Although he expressly rejected the natural rights theory, 
he maintained that once a state had settled upon a particular pattern 
of descent, it should not repudiate it. 20 Judge Ellsworth of Con-
15. 2 W. BLACKSTONE, CoMMENTARIES (3d ed. Oxford 1768) (1st ed. Oxford 
1765). 
16. Id. at 11. 
17. Id. at 13. 
18. Id. at 10-11. 
19. Baker v. Mattocks (Super. Ct 1763), in REPORTS OF CASES .ARGUED AND AD-
JUDGED IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF JUDICATURE OF THE PROVINCE OF MASSACHUSETTS 
BAY, BETWEEN 1761 AND 1772, at 69 (J. Quincy, Jr. ed. 1865) [hereinafter cited as 
MASSACHUSETTS BAY REPORTS]. 
20. Baker v. Mattocks (Super. Ct. 1763), in id. ·at 69. See also J. ScURLOCK, 
RETROACTIVE LEGISLATION .AFFECTING !NTERBsrs IN LAND 90-'105 (1953); McMurray, 
Liberty of Testation and Some Modern Limitations Thereon, 14 ILL. L. REV. 96 
(1919) (an excellent but much neglected essay). 
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necticut expressed a similar view in another early case. After point-
ing out that property originally flowed from possession, Judge 
Ellsworth observed that in the state of. nature the property of a de-
cedent belongs to whomever first establishes possession. This sys-
tem obviously promotes disorder: 
To prevent disputes, the laws of society point out a successor, and 
sometimes, from principles of policy still more refined, permit the last 
occupant to do it himself. The right to direct the succession of es-
tates by will, is not a natural, but municipal right-a mere creature 
of law; as is holden by all modern civilians, and is well illustrated 
by Dr. Blackstone.21 
American state and federal courts since the foundation of the new 
nation have been equally committed to the positivist argument. The 
United States Supreme Court's flat statement in United States v. 
Perkins22 stands for the prevailing doctrine: the right to dispose of 
property at death "has always been considered purely a creature of 
statute and within legislative control."23 
Despite this judicial endorsement of the positivist theory and 
Bernard Bailyn's brilliant argument24 that Revolutionary American 
political thought emerged out of the radical Whig tradition in Anglo-
Am<?rica, we still must acknowledge that the natural rights tradition 
formed an exceedingly important part of the intellectual ferment of 
the American Revolution. After all, the Declaration of Indepen-
dence justified colonial separation from Great Britain on the basis of 
"the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God," and, in a Lockeian vein, 
went on to hold that "all men . . . are endowed by their Creator 
with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty 
and the pursuit of Happiness."25 Such natural rights thinking might 
have led in either of two directions with regard to the law of inheri-
tance. On the one hand, it could simply have reinforced the right 
of inheritance and stood as an ultimate, constitutional guarantee 
against the legislative abolition of that right, in which case, as 
Nunnemacher suggests, it might also have provided an even greater 
freedom of testation than Americans currently enjoy. On the other, 
21. Judge Ellsworth's notes to Adams v. Kellog, KIRBY'S CONNECTICUT SUPERIOR 
COURT REPORTS (1785-1789) 438 (1789). St. George Tucker, in his edition of 
Blackstone, was similarly emphatic that "all laws relative to property are juris posi-
tivi." 2 w. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 113 n.10 (S. Tucker ed. 1803). 
22. 163 U.S. 625 (1895). 
23. 163 U.S. at 627. For the most recent survey of the subject, see Chester, In-
heritance and Wealth Taxation in a Just Society, 30 RUTGERS L. REV. 62 (1976). 
24. B. BAILYN, supra note 1. 
25. 1 T. JEFFERSON, THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 429 (J. Boyd ed. 1950). 
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the natural rights philosophy of the Declaration might have stimu-
lated a radical egalitarianism ("all men are created equal") con-
demning the traditional law of inheritance as paternalistic and non-
egalitarian. Thus the natural rights icomponent of the Revolution 
provided relevant but ambiguous guidelines for the study of inherit-
ance. I hope to show that in the end it w~ the theory of the posi-
tivist Blackstone that was used to support the conclusions of Grotius 
and Locke, while the more radical egalitarian potential was only 
fleetingly articulated and never realized. 
II. THE LAW OF INHERITANCE IN COLONIAL AMERICA 
Before examining the idea of inheritance in Revolutionary 
America, I must sketch the general outlines of the legal institution 
as it existed in England and colonial America. The English law of 
inheritance as it came down to Blackstone in the middle of the eigh-
teenth century was still largely a feudal product, and, as Maitland 
wrote, one of the most complicated and least satisfactory branches 
of English law: 
It is in the province of inheritance that our medieval law made its 
worst mistakes. They were natural mistakes. There was much to 
be said for the simple plan of giving all the land to the eldest son. 
There was much to be said for allowing the courts of the church to 
assume a jurisdiction, even an exclusive jurisdiction, in testamentary 
causes. We can hardly blame our ancestors for their dread of intes-
tacy without attacking their religious beliefs. But the consequences 
have been evil. We rue them at the present day, and shall rue them 
so long as there is talk of real and personal property.26 
Reduced to essentials, the law of inheritance in eighteenth-
century England is described as follows. Upon an individual's 
death, the law provided for transmission of his property either to 
those he designated in his will (testamentary disposition) or, in the 
absence of a valid will, to his heirs according to a statutory scheme 
of distribution (intestate succession). Englishmen long enjoyed the 
power to devise personal property by will, but they did not obtain 
a similar power to dispose of real property until passage of the Stat-
ute of Wills in 1540. This Henrician legislation established supstan-
foil liberty of testation in England (and, significantly, also established 
substantial freedom for alienation of property before death), al-
26. 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HisroRY OF ENGLISH LAw 363 (2d ed. 
S. Milsom 1968). This passage touches upon several of the principal complexities 
and inequities of the English law: the distinction between real and personal property, 
the overlapping jurisdiction of common law and ecclesiastical courts over probate 
matters, and the doctrine of primogeniture. 
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though dower, curtesy, the Rule Against Perpetuities, and certain 
other doctrines impinged somewhat on the free will of the testator. 
As Maitland pointed out, however, carrying out the terms of a will 
was complicated by the division of jurisdiction between common-law 
courts, which administered the distribution of the decedent's real 
property, and ecclesiastical courts, which handled his personal prop-
erty. 27 One additional significant feature of the English law of in-
heritance was the doctrine of entail, which enabled a testator to re-
strict the power of the designated recipients of his real property to 
alienate the property during their own lifetimes. When a decedent 
died intestate, his lands descended to his eldest son · (primogeniture) 
and his personal property descended in equal shares to his children, 
with a portion being reserved for his surviving spouse. 
In sum, a man of property in eighteenth-century England could 
dispose more or less freely of his wherewithal by will, while at the 
same time the provision for intestate succession operated clearly in 
favor of his immediate family. The law controlling both testamen-
tary and intestate succession was, to modern eyes, a frightfully 
complicated melange of half-modernized medievalisms. The insti-
tution of inheritance was even more complex because, in addition 
to the formal mechanisms of inheritance, there existed (especially 
among the wealthy classes) a highly developed system of contractual 
family settlements, trust creations, and similar nontestamentary ar-
rangements. 28 The result, incidentally, was a system of inheritance 
that could not operate without a large and sophisticated legal class. 
The American colonists followed the general spirit of the English 
law of inheritance, which was transported to America with many of 
its complications and confusions, although statutory and judicial inno-
vation occurred in every colony.29 The absence of ecclesiastical 
courts led either to the creation of secular probate courts, thereby 
anticipating a later English development, or to the extension of com-
mon law or equity jurisdiction to succession of personal property, 
Considerable divergence from the English rule of primogeniture oc-
curred--especially in the New England colonies, which generally 
opted for partible inheritance of intestate estates, frequently reserv-
27. Id. This intricacy was not transmitted to the New World, where a system 
of ecclesiastical courts never took root. 
28. See generally T. PLUCKNEIT, CONCISE HlsrORY OF nm COMMON LAW 711-
46 (5th ed. 1956). 
29. See generally R. MORRIS, SruDIES IN THE HlsrORY OF AMERICAN LAW 69-125 
(2d ed. 1959). 
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ing a double portion for the eldest son. Entail, however, operated 
in all the colonies after the English fashion. 
As this pattern of restrained innovation suggests, the colonists 
were not inclined to abandon the traditions to which they were ac-
customed. Their annoyance with the complexities of the English 
law of inheritance paralleled the complaints they leveled against 
property law generally. When reform occurred, the colonists did 
little more than tinker with the periphery of the institution. 
III. THE LAW OF INHERITANCE IN REVOLUTIONARY 
AMERICA 
For the Revolutionary generation, the law of inheritance took on 
a new, strategic importance, since it appeared to symbolize the aris-
tocratic aspects of English government against which the Revolution 
increasingly directed itself. The absence of dramatic change in the 
law of inheritance during the colonial period should not distract at-
tention from the disparities in the settings of inheritance in England 
and America. The socioeconomic impact of inheritance, particu-
larly as to real property, was far less in North America than in Eng-
land, where land was scarce. Moreover, the social and political 
structure of the American colonies was vastly less aristocratic than 
that of the Mother Country, and nowhere did this fact have more 
obvious and profound consequences than in the institution of inheri-
tance, which, after all, furnished the principle that defined the suc-
cession to the Crown and the peerage, thereby determining the 
membership of the governing elite. Seen in this light, the contrast 
is a perfect example of Louis Hartz's thesis of the significance of 
America's lack of a feudal past. 30 
Theoretically, at least two courses should have been possible for 
the Revolutionary lawmakers. The first was repudiation of the tra-
ditional concept of inheritance. The second was reform of the law 
of inheritance by excision of what were regarded as its aristrocratic 
excesses, namely primogeniture and entail. This section examines 
the reformist path. The proposals of the exponents of radical 
change are considered in the following section. 
Reform was naturally more appealing to the English society of 
America than was repudiation of traditional inheritance schemes. 
The subject of this reform was discussed at one time or another in 
~ 
30. See L. HARTZ, THE LmERAL TRADmoN IN AMERICA (1955). 
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most of the Revolutionary colonies. In Massachusetts, James Otis 
argued tp.at the impetus to abolish entail was long standing: 
The Common Law and Policy of England have been, this 4 or 500 
years, tired of these entailed estates; . . . Many have been the ill 
Effects felt both by State and Individuals, in Conveyance of these 
Estates; therefore so far from being favoured they have ever been 
discountenanced; and surely never was such an Estate as is here con-
tended for, favoured.31 
His argument, one might add, was as ill conceived as his defense 
of primogeniture two years earlier.82 
The brightest example of the reform process is the revision of 
inheritance law in Virginia, where statutory reform, largely the work 
of Thomas Jefferson, was comprehensive. Throughout the seven-
. teenth century, Virginia had followed rather closely the traditional 
English law. In 1705, however, the General Court passed an act 
forbidding the docking of entails except by special acts of the legis-
lature, thereby foreclosing resort to the traditional and relatively 
painless E.nglish mode of terminating entails by fine and recovery. 
Subsequent legislation restored the right of docking for small estates 
and allowed the leasing of entailed land, but for the most part Vir-
ginia inheritance law prior to Jefferson's campaign to republicanize 
the state's legal system largely adhered to the English system. 88 
Jefferson's first success was the legislation of 14 October 1776 
that abolished entails. The preamble to this act clearly stated its 
purpose: 
Whereas the perpetuation of property in certain families by means 
of gifts made to them in fee-tail is contrary to good policy, tends to 
deceive fair traders who give a credit on the visible possession of such 
estates, discourages the holder thereof from taking care of and im-
proving the same, and sometimes does injury to the morals of youth 
by rendering them independent of, and disobedient to, their parents; 
and whereas the former method of docking such estates tail by spe-
cial act of assembly formed for every particular case employed very 
much of the time of the legislature, was burthensome to the public, 
and also to the individuals who made application for such acts. 84 
Three years later Jefferson prepared a "Statute of Descents" to 
abolish primogeniture and replace it with partible inheritance in 
equal shares to the children of a decedent. He desired, he said in 
31. Banister v. Henderson (1765), in MASSACHUSETIS BAY REPORTS, supra note 
19, at 140. 
32. See text at notes 19-20 supra. 
33. This account follows Keim, Primogeniture and Entail in Colonial Virginia, 
25 WM. & MARY L.Q. 545 (1968); see also 1 D. MALONE, JEFFERSON AND His TIME 
251-60 (1948); 3 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 21, at app. 11-51. 
34. 1 T. JEFFERSON, supra note 25, at 560. 
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his autobiography, "to abolish the law of primogeniture, and to make 
real estate descendible in parcenary to the next of kin, as personal 
property is by the statute of distribution."35 This statute was finally 
enacted in 1785, and thus, within two years after the end of the 
Revolutionary War, Virginia had done away with both entail and 
primogeniture. South Carolina and Delaware had abolished entail 
in 177 6, and by the end of the eighteenth century virtually all of 
the new American states had eliminated both devices, although the 
several alternatives to primogeniture they enacted for the distribu-
tion of intestate estates varied considerably. 
The state constitutions of 1776 provide additional evidence of 
the effort to reform the law of inheritance. The New Jersey consti-
tution provided that the estates of suicides should not be forfeited 
"but shall descend in the same manner, as they would have done, 
had such persons died in the natural way."86 The Maryland consti-
tution forbade the devise of lands for the support of "any minister, 
public teacher, or preacher of the gospel, as such, or any religious 
sect, order or denomination," although bequests of less than two 
acres of land for the actual construction of a house of worship were 
permitted. 37 North Carolina proclaimed that "perpetuities and 
monopolies are contrary to the genius of a free State, and ought not 
to be allowed."38 Pennsylvania39 and Georgia40 wrote regulation 
or abolition of entail into their Revolutionary constitutions. Several 
states forbade hereditary honors,41 and New Hampshire provided 
that "[n]o office or place whatsoever in government, shall be heredi-
tary-the abilities and integrity requisite in all, not being trans-
missible to posterity or relations."42 
In fact, however, this legal and constitutional change was largely 
formal and symbolic. Primogeniture did not exist in many of the 
colonies, especially in New England, prior to the Revolution, and it 
is not clear that the use of either primogeniture or entail to restrict 
the distribution of property was widespread. Indeed, detailed stud-
35. 2 id. at 393n. Jefferson successfully opposed an attempt to include a provi-
sion for a double share to the eldest son. 
36. N.J. CoNsT. of 1776, art. XVII, in 5 F. THORPE, THE FEDERAL AND STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS 2597 (1909). 
37. Mo. CONST. of 1776, art. XXXIV, in 3 id. at 1690. 
38. N.C. CoNsT. of 1776, art. XXIlI, in 5 id. at 2788. 
39. PA. CoNsT. of 1776, art. 37, in 5 id. at 3090. 
40. GA. CONST. of 1777, art. LI, in 2 id. at 784. 
41. See Mo. CoNsT. of 1776, art. XL, in 3 id. at 1690; N.C. CoNST. of 1776, 
art. XXII, in 5 id. at 2788; S.C. CONST. of 1790, art. IX,§ 5, in 6 id. at 3264. 
42. N.H. CoNST. of 1784, art. IX, in 4 id. at 2455. 
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ies of testamentary disposition in the colonial period suggest that the 
practice of testators was seldom to bestow all, or even the bulk, of 
their lands on the eldest son and that, aside from the usual preferen-
tial treatment of sons, testators generally partitioned their estates in 
nearly equal shares.43 If the changes were primarily formal, why 
then should Revolutionary Americans have paid so much atten-
tion and attributed so much significance to the reform of the law 
of inheritance? 
IV. INHERITANCE LAW AND REPUBLICAN IDEOLOGY 
The rhetoric of the preambles of the Revolutionary and post-
Revolutionary acts governing inheritance offers a clue to why reform 
was so important. These declarations of legislative purpose reveal 
that the regulation of inheritance was viewed as a focal point of scat-
tered, ineffectual statutory efforts to reform the economic structure 
of society in order to promote egalitarian ideals and to establish the 
foundation of a republican polity."4 For example, the preamble to 
the 1794 Delaware statute repealing an old law granting a double 
share to the eldest son declared that "it is the duty and policy of 
every republican government to preserve equality amongst its 
citizens, by maintaining the balance of property as far as it is consist-
ent with ·the rights of individuals."45 North Carolina's comprehen-
sive revision of inheritance law in 1784 resounds with the same egali-
tarian republican ideology: 
WHEREAS it will tend to promote that equality of property which is 
of the ~pirit and principle of a genuine republic, that the real estates 
of persons dying intestate should undergo a more general and equal 
distribution than has hitherto prevailed in this state. . . . 
And whereas it is almost peculiar to the law of Great-Britain, and 
founded in principles of the feudal system, which no longer apply in 
that government, and can never apply in this state, that the halfblood 
should be excluded from the inheritance. . . • 
43. Deen, Patterns of Testations: Four Tidewater Counties in Colonial Virginia, 
16 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 1S4 (1972); Keim, supra note 33, at S51-S1. See also D, 
FISHER, GROWING OLD IN AMERICA 97-98 (1977); Andrews, The Influence of Colo-
nial Conditions as Illustrated in the Connecticut Intestacy Law, in 1 SELECT EssAYS 
IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 431 (1907); Smith, Parental Power and Mar-
riage Patterns: An Analysis of Historical Trends in Hingham, Massachusetts, 3S J. 
MARR. & FAM. 419 (1973); Waters, Patrimony, Succession, and Social Stability: 
Guilford, Connecticut in the Eighteenth Century, 10 PERSPECTIVES AM. HIST. 129 
(1976). 
44. Of course, not all reform had such lofty ideals. Some revisions were insti-
tuted to remedy the disruption caused by the war. See, e.g., 1 Laws of the State of 
New York, ch. S9, § 1 (S. Jones & R. Varick ed. 1789) (giving remedies against ex-
ecutors who misappropriated estates during the British occupation). 
4S. 2 Laws of the State of Delaware, ch. S3 (S. & J. Adams pub. 1797). 
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And whereas entails of estates tend only to raise the wealth and im-
portance of particular families and individuals, giving them an un-
equal and undue influence in a republic, and prove in manifold in-
stances the source of great contention and injustice .... 46 
15 
To implement these views, the North Carolina legislature replaced 
primogeniture with partible inheritance .among sons, eliminated the 
discrimination against brothers and sisters of the half blood, and con-
verted all holdings in fee tail to fee simple. 47 
The most eloquent and thoroughgoing exponent of this doctrine 
was Thomas Jefferson. Jefferson's first great public project was the 
reform of Virginia's law, and the revision of the law of inheritance 
was the first item on his agenda. 48 Reflecting on this episode in 
his autobiography, Jefferson explained the strategic significance of 
this portion of the law: 
I considered 4 of these bills . . . as forming a system by which every 
fibre would be eradicated of antient [sic] or future aristocracy; and 
a foundation laid for a government truly republican. The repeal of 
the laws of entail would prevent the accumulation and perpetuation 
of wealth in select families, and preserve the soil of the country from 
being daily more & more absorbed in Mortmain. The abolition of 
primogeniture, and equal partition of inheritances removed the feudal 
and unnatural distinctions which made one member of every family 
rich, and all the rest poor, substituting equal partition, the best of 
all Agrarian laws.49 
Jefferson stressed the ease with which this portion of the aristrocratic 
legal establishment could be altered: "To effect it no violence was 
necessary, no deprivation of natural right, but rather an enlargement 
of it by a repeal of the--law."50 
At this early stage in the development of Jefferson's social 
thought, he stressed that the creation and maintenance of a republic 
required not just barriers to aristocratic accumulation of property, but 
also a scheme to distribute at least small parcels of land to all mem-
bers of the society. This view was reflected iri a bill drafted by Jef-
ferson in January 1778 in which he proposed that every freeborn 
Virginian who marries and resides in the state for one year receive 
46. 1 The Public Acts of the General Assembly of North Carolina, ch. 22 (J. 
Iredell ed., F.X. Martin rev. 1804). 
41. Id. 
48. See text at note 34 supra. 
49. T. JEFFERSON, AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, 1743-1790, at 77-78 
(P. Ford ed. 1914). For an extended discussion of the subject, see Katz, Thomas 
Jefferson and the Right to Property in Revolutionary America, 19 J. LAW & EcoN. 
467 (1976). 
50. T. JEFFERSON, supra note 49, at 58. For a similar expression of opinion by 
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"seventy five Acres of waste or unappropriated Land." The purpose 
of this measure, Jefferson explained, was to promote "the more 
equal Distribution of Lands, and to encourage Marriage and popula-
tion."51 
Jefferson's belief that the yeoman farmer constituted the back-
bone of a republican society is well known. Less widely recognized, 
however, is that his schemes for republicanizing the property law and 
for distributing unused land proceeded from his revisionist view of 
the history of English land law. Jefferson believed in the theory 
of "the Norman Yoke"-that feudalism was a French import, im-
posed by William the Conqueror upon the democratic Saxons of the 
British Isles-and he fervently advocated restoration of the aborigi-
nal political order as he perceived it. "Are we not the better," he 
asked Edmund Pendleton in August 1776, 
for what we have hitherto abolished of the feudal system? Has not 
every restitution of the antient [sic] Saxon laws had happy effects? Is 
it not better now that we return at once into that happy system of 
our ancestors, the wisest and most perfect ever yet devised by the 
wit of man, as it stood before the 8th century?52 
Obviously he thought that it was, and it confirmed him in his view 
that land tenures in Virginia were "allodial," or nonfeudal, and, 
therefore, that the best policy would be to parcel out the land in 
small quantities to the inhabitants of Virginia. Thus, Jefferson's in-
terest in the property system was twofold. First, he sought to iden-
tify and extirpate the feudal-aristocratic character of the land law, 
especially those particularly egregious vestiges that permitted previous 
generations to fetter the use of property in the present. Second, he 
proposed to dispose of the territory thus disencumbered by distribut-
ing it broadly among the populace. 
These were Jefferson's views at the beginning of the Revolution; 
his thinking, provoked by his experiences in France, developed 
further in the 1780s. Observing firsthand the stark contrast in 
Europe between the immense wealth of the landed elite and the 
destitution of the landless, .he was convinced that only drastic redis-
tribution of property would alleviate poverty. He attributed the 
widespread unemployment of able and willing workers, amid great 
James Wilson at the Philadelphia Constitutional Convention, see the debate of June 
7, 1787, in 1 THE RECORDS OF TIIE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 at 159 (M. Far-
rand ed. 1911). 
51. 2 T. JEFFERSON, supra note 25, at 139-40. This portion of the bill was 
not enacted, however. Id. at 147 n.12. 
52. Id. at 492. 
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reserves of uncultivated land, to the high concentration of land 
ownership. Because of their great wealth, the proprietors paid no 
attention to expanding production. Jefferson recognized "that an 
equal division of property is impracticable." "But," he told James 
Madison in a famous letter written at Fountainbleu in October 1785, 
"the consequences of this enormous inequality producing so much 
misery to the bulk of mankind, legislators cannot invent too many 
devices for subdividing property, only taking care to let their subdivi-
sions go hand. in hand with the natural affections of the human 
mind."63 Specifically, Jefferson recommended that the rules of in-
heritance require wide distribution of a decedent's estate among his 
relations and that the state levy progressive estate taxes on large 
estates.64 
In this and in a second letter to Madison, written in September 
1789, Jefferson set forth his philosophical approach to the law of 
inheritance. In 1785 he had concluded that 
,[w]henever there is in any country, uncultivated lands and unem-
ployed poor, it is clear that the laws of property have been so far 
extended as to violate natural right. The earth is given as a com-
mon stock for map. to labour and live on [and] . . . [i]f, for the 
encouragement of industry we allow it to be appropriated, we must 
take care that other employment be furnished to those excluded from 
the appropriation. If we do not the fundamental right to labour the 
earth returns to the unemployed. 55 
Jefferson returned, with greater confidence, to the same theme in 
his remarkable letter of 1789, which represents the culmination of 
his thinking on the problem of the intergenerational transmission of 
wealth. In this letter he proposed to Madison the "self evident" 
proposition " 'that the earth belongs in usufruct to the living': that 
the dead have neither powers nor rights over it." The critical 
passage is worth quoting in full: 
The portion occupied by an individual ceases to be his when himself 
ceases to be, and reverts to the society. If the society has formed no 
rules for the appropriation of it's lands in severality, it will be taken 
by the first occupants. These will generally be the wife and children 
of the decedent. If they have formed rules of appropriation, those 
rules may give it to the wife and children, or to some one of them, 
or to the legatee of the deceased. So they may give it to his credi-
tor. But the child, the legatee, or creditor takes it, not by any 
53. 8 T. JEFFERSON, supra note 25, at 682; 8 J. MADISON, THE PAPERS OF JAMES 
MADISON 386 (R. Rutland & W. Racbal eds. 1973). Note the response from Madison 
on June 119, 1786, in 9 id. at 76. 
54. 8 T. JEFFERSON, supra note 25, at 682. 
55. Id. 
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natural right, but by a law of the society of which they are members, 
and to which they are subject. Then no man can, by natural right, 
oblige the lands he occupied, or the persons who succeed him in that 
occupation, to the paiment [sic] of debts contracted by him. For 
if he could, he might, during his own life, eat up the usufruct of the 
lands for several generations to come, and then the lands would be-
long to the dead, and not to the living, which would be the reverse 
of our principle. 56 
We are th.us confronted with the fascinating spectacle of a natural 
rights thinker escaping from a natural rights tradition. Jefferson was 
perfectly aware that inheritance had generally ,been considered a 
natural right, but of course his own conclusions are precisely those 
of Blackstone and the positivists. He therefore favored legislation 
prescribing a just distribution of intestate property. Yet, the real 
logic of his self-evident proposition· might well have led him to advo-
cate the total abolition of inheritance. If the earth truly belongs to 
,the living, the right of the dead to stipulate by will the disposition of 
· their property is not easily justified, and the legitimacy of intestate 
succession seems insecure as well. Of course, by 17 8 9 Jefferson was 
both geographically and politically far removed from the affairs of 
state government, and he never again concerned himself with inher-
itance legislation. Nevertheless, it is significant that at least one in-
fluential Revolutionary American perceived that the logic of republi-
can revolution pointed toward radical reevaluation of the law of 
inheritance. 
Admittedly, Jefferson stood alone among his American com-
patriots in espousing such radical views. In the broader context of 
contemporaneous European . .thought, however, Jefferson repre-
sented a main current of "radical" Enlightenment doctrine. To appre-
ciate the intellectual environment in which Jefferson, and Americans 
generally, developed their views toward inheritance, one needs to 
· consider proposals for the programmatic reform of inheritance law 
that circulated in England and France-the European societies with 
the strongest political and intellectual affinity with America. Ex-
amination of radical thought on inheritance in Europe is valuable in 
other respects as well. Comparing the American attitudes toward 
inheritance with those expressed in Europe helps identify critical 
features of the republican critique of inheritance and, ultimately, 
such a comparison aids in the interpretation of the character of the 
American Revolution. 
The foremost English contemporary who shared Jefferson's radi-
56. 15 id. at 392-93 (emphasis original). 
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cal perspective was Thomas Paine. Paine's thoughts on inheritance 
are contained in two works published in the 1790s: the second part 
of the Rights of Man, the manifesto that earned Paine conviction for 
seditious libel, and Agrarian Justice, his last great pamphlet. Like 
Jefferson, Paine regarded poverty as a symptom of the maldistribu-
tion of property maintained by the aristocratic pattern of inheritance. 
But, where Jefferson advocated statutory revision of the rules of suc-
cession, Paine's chosen instrument of reform was the estate tax. 
In the second part of the Rights of Man, he proposed a steeply 
progressive estate tax, reaching a one hundred per cent marginal rate 
for very large estates. He maintained that a large estate is a 
"luxury" and should be taxed accordingly, although he recognized 
that policy militated against imposing a ceiling on the size of an 
estate "acquired by industry."57 One purpose served by the tax, in 
Paine's mind, was to shift the tax burden to those persons best cap-
able of bearing it, but his tax proposal obviously had deeper impli-
cations. In Paine's words: 
[T]he chief object of this progressive tax (besides the justice of ren-
dering taxes more equal than they are) is . . . to extirpate the over-
grown influence arising from the unnatural law of primogeniture, and 
which is one of the principle sources of corruption at elections. 58 
In short, Paine's proposed tax would apply pecuniary pressures to 
achieve the same results as statutory abolition of primogeniture: the 
fragmentation of large estates and a more even distribution of prop-
erty in society.-09 
Paine returned to the subject of inheritance in Agrarian Justice, 
where he developed more explicitly the relationship between his 
proposed reforms and his theory of political economy. In Paine's 
view, each individual is entitled to exclusive possession of the prod-
uct of his labor, but .the earth's natural resources-such as land-
57. 1 T. PAINE, The Rights of Man, in nm COMPLETE WRITINGS OF THOMAS 
PAINE 241, 434 (P. Foner ed. 1945). As noted before, see text at note 54 supra, Jef-
ferson had also advocated progressive estate taxation as a means of accomplishing 
redistribution of property. In a 1795 letter to Madison, he wrote: "Another means 
of silently lessening the inequality of property is to exempt all from taxation below 
a certain point, and to tax the higher portions of property in geometrical progression 
as they rise." 8 T. JEFFERSON, supra note 25, at '682. However, Jefferson repudi-
ated progressive taxation toward the end of his life. In 1816 he wrote: "If the over-
grown wealth of an individual be deemed dangerous to the state, the best corrective 
is the law of equal inheritance to all in equal degree; and the better, as this enforces 
a law of nature, while extra-taxation violates it." R. ScHLAITER, PRIVATE PROPER1Y: 
ToE HISTORY OF AN IDEA 197 (1951) (quoting Jefferson). 
58. 1 T. PAINE, The Rights of Man, supra note 57, at 437. 
59. Paine noted specifically that the operation of the tax would "supersede the 
aristocratical law of primogeniture." Id. at 434. 
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belong to all, because "natural property . . . comes to us from the 
Creator."60 Private possession of land came about, Paine reasoned, 
when tillage replaced gathering and hunting as the source of soci-
ety's food supply-the seminal event making possible the transition 
of society from a "natural" to a "civilized" state. Cultivation fostered 
private ownership of land since the improvement of the land, which 
rightfully belongs to the cultivator, was inseparable from the land 
itself. 61 Thus, poverty originated as an incident of civilization, for 
the appropriation of the land by some denied others their share of 
mankind's "natural inheritance." 
Cultivation is at least one of the greatest natural improvements ever 
made by human invention. It has given to created earth a tenfold 
value. But the landed monopoly that began with it has produced 
the greatest evil. It has dispossessed more than half the inhabitants 
of every nation of their natural inheritance . . . and has thereby 
created a species of poverty and wretchedness that did not exist be-
fore. 62 
Paine advanced a simple solution to restore the "natural" order 
without disturbing private ownership of property. His plan called 
for the collection of a "ground-rent" from each proprietor, represent-
. ing the use value of the appropriated "natural property," and for the 
distribution of the proceeds to all members of society, who collec-
tively own this property. More specifically, he proposed the estab-
lishment of a fund, maintained by a moderate estate tax, from which 
each citizen would receive a lump sum on his twenty-first birthday 
and a P,ension upon reaching the age of fifty. 63 
Although Paine emphasized that adoption of his plan would 
immediately benefit society by meliorating the condition of the 
masses, he was plainly inspired by more than altruism. Paine en-
visioned a transformation of society. "The present state of civiliza-
tion," he stated, "is as odious as it is unjust. It is absolutely the 
opposite of what it should be, and it is necessary that a revolution 
should be made in it."64 Far from being merely a social welfare 
60. 1 T. PAINE, Agrarian Justice, in id. at 606. 
61. Id. at 611-12. 
62. Id. at 612. 
63. Under Paine's plan, a flat ten per cent tax rate would be levied on the portion 
of the estate inherited by the decedent's issue, with a surtax rising to ten per cent 
levied on that portion transmitted to others, the rate increasing according to the re-
moteness of the transferee. Id. at 615.,16. The tax applied to both real and per-
sonal property because, as Paine argued, no individual could acquire personal prop-
erty without the aid of society, therefore, "he owes on every principle of justice, of 
gratitude, and of civilization, a part of that accumulation back again to society from 
whence the whole came." Id. at 620. 
64. Id. at 617. 
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measure, Paine conceived the estate tax as the linchpin in the real-
ization of this vision. 65 
The occasion for recasting inheritance law did not arise in 
eighteenth-century England, where the republican answer to the 
question of inheritance, as on other questions, subsisted for the 
moment only in doctrine. To find a legislative counterpoint to the 
revision of inheritance law . in America, attention must turn to 
France. A glance at the doctrines espoused by the French revolu-
tionaries in regard to inheritance confirms our earlier observation 
that the constitution of the law of inheritance has a capital strategic 
importance to the framers of a republican order. Moreover, the re-
publicanization of the institution of inheritance in France evinces the 
confrontation between the natural rights and the positivist theories 
of property law. As with Jefferson, the French proponents of re-
form were compelled to overcome their original natural rights orien-
tation to justify the measures they advanced. 
By 1791 republicanism was the official creed of the French 
Revolution, and the revolutionaries recognized that the Romano-
feudal system of inheritance by which the Old Regime had oper:ated 
was part and parcel of the system of inherited privilege and en-
trenched wealth against which the Revolution initially aimed. As 
the Comte de Mirabeau pointed out to the Constituent Assembly in 
the midst of its debate on intestate succession: "You have begun by 
destroying feudalism, you pursue today its effects."60 
65. The ideological inspiration underlying the proposals of Paine and Jefferson 
differentiates them from other proponents of reform, such as Jeremy Bentham, who 
were motivated primarily by pragmatic fiscal concerns. Bentham, for example, de-
nounced the natural rights .thesis about inheritance while proposing in a crudely writ-
ten pamphlet published in 1795 that the entire estate escheat to the state if the dece-
dent lacked "near relations" and that the power to devise property by will apply only 
to one-half of such a decedent's estate, the remainder going to the state. 1 J. BEN-
'IHAM, Supply Without Burthen; or Escheat Vice Taxation, in JEREMY BENTIIAM's 
EcoNOMIC WRITINGS 279, 283-84, 310 (W. Stark ed. 1952). Despite the revolution-
ary tenor of this proposal, Bentham disclaimed radical political goals. He exempted 
the peerage from the plan, conceding the desirability of preserving the aristocracy. 
Id. at 328. Bentham's aims, not surprisingly, were utilitarian. He believed that most 
taxation aroused hostility because it deprived people of what they had expected to 
enjoy. Id. at 292. Similarly, in Bentham's view, the intricacies and uncertainties 
of the traditional system of inheritance worked hardship on many by denying an ex-
pected legacy. Id. at 319. Therefore, under Bentham's plan, no property would 
be taken from one who expected to enjoy it, since the law would make clear the lim-
ited expectations for inheritance. Id. at 292-93. In short, Bentham regarded his 
scheme as the least disruptive mode of taxation. He explained that "[t]he character-
istic of this measure, is to shew more tenderness to [the] feelings [of individuals], 
than can be shewn by the taxes to which it is proposed to substitute it." Id. at 305 
(emphasis original). 
66. 9 P. BUCHEZ & P. Roux, HISTOIRE PARLEMENTAIRE DE LA REVOLUTION FRAN-
CAISE 285 (Paris 1834). 
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In April 1791 the Constituent Assembly made a first effort to 
extirpate the ancien regime with the adoption of a "Decree Relative 
to the Distribution of Intestate Successions." The decree an-
nounced: 
All inequality formerly resulting, among heirs ab intestat, from 
qualities of age or of youth, from sex distinctions or from customary 
exclusions, whether in direct line or in the collateral line, is abol-
ished. 67 
The debates in the Assembly, however, reveal that republican 
ideology in France was not satisfied with equality in intestate suc-
cession. The powerful egalitarian thrust of French republicanism 
insisted on equality in testate succession as well. For example, the 
Jacobin delegate Petion demaqded in the 1791 debates that the As-
sembly "destroy for the future all of the inequalities of distribution 
resulting from the arbitrary will of the family head."68 
The Comte de Mirabeau, himself a disinherited son, prepared 
the principal speech of the debate. This address, delivered by Tally-
rand as its author was on his death bed, expands Petion's theme: 
Here is the fundamental question which presents itself: Should the 
law admit among us the free disposition of wealth in the direct line, 
that is to say, should a father or a mother, a grandfather or a grand-
mother, have the right to dispose at their wish of their fortune by 
contract or by testament, and to establish thereby inequality in the 
possession of domestic goods?69 
One turns to Robespierre, just as one turned to Jefferson, for 
exposition of the revolutionary republican doctrine by its most re-
nowned advocate. Robespierre praised the delegates for having 
abolished preferences in intestate succession, but, urging them to 
strike deeper, he inveighed against the right of testation as enabling 
.an individual to defeat the egalitarian policy embodied in the new 
regime for intestate succession. "You have decreed," he intoned, 
"that equality shall be the ·basis of [intestate] succession. Will you 
permit this law to be violated by the private will of man?"70 Like 
Jefferson and Paine, Robespierre regarded revision of the law of in-
heritance as critical to the establishment of the material substructure 
of a republican polity. He maintained that free testation is neces-
sarily inimical to the ideal social order, in which equality prevails: 
61. Decret relatif au partage des successions ab intestat, in 2 CoLLECilON COM• 
PLETE DES LOIS, DECRETS, ORDONNANCES, REGLEMENS, ET AVIS DU CONSEIL--D'ETAT 
348 (J. Duvergier ed. 1824) (Decree of April 15, 1791). 
68. 9 P. BuCHEZ & P. Roux, supra note 66, at 284. 
69. Id. at 286. 
10. Id. at 299. 
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"The too great inequality of fortunes is the source of political in-
equality [and] of the destruction of liberty."71 Robespierre went 
so far as to suggest that the power to dispose of property by will 
should be abolished altogether. "Can a man dispose of that land 
he has tilled," he asked, "at the moment he is reduced to dust? No, 
the property of a man after his death ought to return to the public 
domain of society."72 Nevertheless, Robespierre opposed complete 
abolition of testation. He favored allowing an individual to direct 
the disposition of part of his estate so long as the testator divided 
the property equally among his heirs. 73 
The Constituent Assembly did not embrace Robespierre's 
recommendation. In March 1793, however, the Assembly's succes-
sor, the National Convention, did enact legislation abolishing the 
power to make inter vivos or testamentary transfers of property to 
descendents, thereby subjecting all estates to the egalitarian distribu-
tion imposed by the law of intestate succession. This legislation did 
not abolish inheritance; rather, it demonstrated that the French 
revolutionaries were prepared to go to relatively extreme lengths 
to achieve the vision of formal legal equality among all citizens. 74 . 
The revolutionaries never seriously threatened to abolish private 
property. Even Robespierre was a moderate on the question of 
property rights, 75 and there is little evidence of agitation for radical 
11. Id. 
12. Id. at 300. 
73. Id. at 300-01. 
74. As George Lefebvre observed, "[fhe Constituent Assembly] closely joined 
equality to liberty, and by bringing the resounding collapse of privileges and feudal-
ism the popular revolution highlighted equality as the Anglo-Saxons had not done. 
The revolutionaries and even the bourgeoisie valued the attainment of equality above 
all else." G. LEFEBVRE, THE FRENCH REVOLUTION FROM ITS ORIGINS TO 1793, at 
146 (1962). 
The reforms of the Constituent Assembly did not long survive intact, however, 
as Napoleon later restored much of the power of testation. For a recent discussion 
of French inheritance law in this period, see Giesey, Rules of Inheritance and Strate-
gies of Mobility in Prerevolutionary France, 82 AM. HlsT. REv. 271 (1977). Giesey 
explains the rich complexity of coutumier law and its relationship to French politico-
economic change in the revolutionary era. See also J. Traer, Equality in the Year 
Two: The Development of French Succession Law at the End of the Eighteenth 
Century (Oct. 1976) (unpublished paper delivered to the 6th Annual Meeting of the 
American Society for Legal History, Philadelphia). For a novel reinterpretation of 
the significance of private property during the French Revolution, see Taylor, Non-
capitalist Wealth and the Origins of the French Revolution, 12 AM. HIST. REv. 469 
(1967). 
15. 2 J. THOMPSON, ROBESPIERRE 39-40 (1935). Robespierre may have been 
concerned more with the image than the actual achievement of equality. In 1793 
he wrote: "Personally, I think equality of wealth even less necessary for private than 
for public happiness. It is much more necessary to make poverty respected than to 
ban millionaires (proscrire ['opulence)." Id. at 40. · 
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reform of the French institution of property.76 Nevertheless, the de-
bates on inheritance did expose certain ambiguities in the fundamen-
tal attitudes of the revolutionaries toward property. The Declaration 
of the Rights of Man .and Citizen, promulgated 27 August 1789, re-
flected a pronounced commitment to the natural rights theory of 
property. Article Two, for example, announced that "[t]he aim of 
every political association is the preservation of the natural and in-
alienable rights of man,"77 among which was the right of property. 
Article Seventeen stated the natural rights position even more em-
phatically: "Since property is a sacred and inviolable right, no one 
may be deprived thereof unless a legally established public necessity 
obviously requires it, and upon condition of a just and previous in-
demnity ."78 
The proponents of radical revision of the laws of inheritance, 
however, contended that property is a social creation, properly sub-
ject to the limitations imposed by society in order to achieve its 
broader ideals. In his address to the Constituent Assembly in 1781, 
Mirabeau asserted that 
[a]s property is based on the social structure [l'etat social], it is sub-
jected, like the other benefits over which society is arbiter, to laws 
[and] to conditions; thus we see everywhere the right of property 
subjected to certain rules, and restricted, according to the case, to 
limits more or less narrow. . . . 
Society is thus entitled to refuse its members, in this or that case, 
the capacity to dispose arbitrarily of their fortune. 79 
Robespierre pursued a similar theme in his speech to the 
Assembly. Stating that the property of a decedent returns to the 
public domain, he contended that "it is only for the public interest 
that [society] transmits this wealth to the issue of the . . . owner; 
but, the public interest is in equality. Thus, it is necessary that in 
every case equality be established in the succession."80 
Robespierre criticized the Declaration of Rights for failing to de-
fine necessary limits on the freedom of the use of property. In his 
view, the document was "not so much a declaration of the rights of 
men, as a declaration of the rights of capitalists [riches], profiteers, 
speculators, and tyrants."81 To remedy this dangerous omission, 
16. See R. PALMER, TwELVE WHO RULED 280-304 (1941). 
77. J. STEWART, A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 114 
(1951). 
78. Id. at 115. 
79. 9 P. BucHEZ & P. Roux, supra note 66, at 288. 
80. Id. at 300. 
81. 2 J, THOMPSON, supra note 75, at 40. 
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Robespierre proposed a slate of amended articles to make clear that 
the state may curb an individual's property rights in order to protect 
the rights of others. He suggested, for example, that Article Two 
read: "The right of property is limited, like every other right, by 
the duty of respecting the rights of others."82 
Clearly the French Revolution occasioned a more sweeping 
revision of the law of inheritance than did the American Revolution. 
Like Jefferson and Paine,83 the French revolutionaries did not ques-
tion the fundamental concept of private property, but an ardent de-
sire for equality inspired the French to rewrite in bold strokes the 
rules governing succession to property. The legislation amending 
inheritance in Revolutionary America was, in comparison, quite 
tame. Yet, notwithstanding the striking contrast in the substance of 
the changes wrought, the significance of the French and American 
statutory programs to their respective authors was comparable. The 
proponents of revision conceived of reform as one important means to 
achieve, or at least to express, related ideological ends. The reforms 
in America had smaller compass than those in France, commen-
surate with the more moderate stance of American republicanism. 
In addition, the reform process everywhere manifested a philo-
sophical reorientation with respect to the concept of property rights. 
The remaining presupposition-that the power of testamentary dis-
position, like other capacities to use and transfer property, is a 
"natural right" upon which the state cannot rightly infringe-was 
permanently displaced by the doctrine that an individual's· rights in 
property subsist by grace of society. Under this view, the state jus-
tifiably limits property rights where their exercise ·would contravene 
higher social values. It is important to realize that this development 
did not represent an abandonment of the belief in' a "natural order" 
in favor of a complete relativism: the proponents of reform-Paine 
is an obvious example-continued to speak in terms of natural 
"rights." Rather, they ascribed a new content to these preordained 
rights, and they accorded to the right of inheritance a much lower 
priority than they did to the more general right to property. 
82. Id. 
83. Paine's commitment to private property is reflected in his comment that a sys-
tem of compensating individuals dispossessed of their "natural inheritance," thereby 
eliminating indigency, "is necessary as well for the protection of property as for the 
sake of justice and humanity." 1 T. PAINE, Agrarian Justice, supra note 57, at 620. 
To Paine, the virtue of his plan was that ft restored social justice, yet strengthened 
rather than disturbed the economic system of private property that made civilization 
possible. Id. at 620-21. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
[Vol. 76:1 
It has been1 said that the contrast between the French and 
American revolutions is that between social and political revolu-
tion. 84 Even if one neither underestimates the turbulence and re-
sulting dislocations during the period of the American Revolution 
nor overestimates the discontinuity between French society before 
and after the Revolution of 1789, it seems clear that the society that 
emerged after 177 6 was the logical and evolutionary successor to co-
lonial America in a manner totally unlike the considerably more pro-
found transformation in France. One might more accurately de-
scribe the American experience as a "reform movement" than as an 
"internal revolution." 
Ultimately, inheritance is not a conclusive test for the character 
of the American Revolution, for it was an epiphenomenon of the 
larger social process. The changes instituted in the law of inherit-
ance were not trivial85 or startling. Neither primogeniture nor entail, 
the principal targets of statutory revision, were widely practiced be-
fore the Revolution-in several colonies they had never existed-
so that in some sense the Revolution cannot even be credited with 
truly reforming the law of inheritance. Yet, insofar as the Revolu-
tion ratified rather than inspired this reform, its impact on the insti-
tution of inheritance typifies the significance of the Revolution to 
many areas of American society. As Bernard Bailyn has observed, 
the Revolution confirmed developments that had been taking place 
in the colonies and had been transforming them, unknowingly, into 
a new society and nation: 
In behalf of Enlightenment liberalism the revolutionary leaders un-
dertook to complete, formalize, systematize and symbolize what pre-
viously had been only partially realized, confused, and disputed 
matters of fact. Enlightenment ideas were not instruments of a par-
ticular social group, nor did they destroy a social order. They did 
not create new social and political forces in America. They released 
84. See H. ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 87 (1963). 
85. Alexis de Tocqueville carried the argument to its furthest extreme, contend-
ing that "the law of inheritance was the last step to equality." 1 A. DB TOCQUEVILLE, 
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 47 (P. Bradley ed. 1945). He believed that "the law of 
equal division exercises its influence not merely upon the property itself, but it af-
fects the minds of the heirs and brings their passions into play. These indirect conse-
quences tend powerfully to the destruction of large fortunes, and especially of large 
domains." Id. at 48-49. For this reason, "[w]hen the legislator has once regulated 
the law of inheritance, he may rest from his labor." Id. at 48. De Tocqueville 
here overestimates both the theoretical and actual impact of republican laws of in-
heritance upon nineteenth-century American society. 
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those that had long existed, and vastly increased their power.86 
Political and economic liberalism were at the core of these emergent 
American social forces, and the search for a theoretical justification 
for what the Americans regarded as their essential task-separation 
from Britain and formation of a new nation-progressively drew 
them to republican models of social organization. The patermµism 
and aristocratic bias inherent in the traditional Anglo-American sys-
tem of inheritance were increasingly perceived to be incompatible 
with republican attitudes toward economics and politics. The tradi-
tional system represented an economic order in which a propertied 
elite preserved monopolistic control over a critical resource and pro-
tected large fortunes from the rigors of individual enterprise. 
But in fact the Americans were most sensitive to the political 
connotations of the traditional laws of inheritance. Primogeniture 
and entail preserved and transmitted political as well as economic 
fortunes. The Americans rejected categorically the notion that po-
litical office is a private possession transmittable by the laws 
of succession. As George Mason declared in the Virginia Declara-
tion of Rights: 
no Man, or Set of Men are entitled to exclusive. or separate 
Emoluments or Privileges from the Community, but in Consideration 
of public Services; which not being descendible, or hereditary, the 
Ideal of a Man born a Magistrate, a Legislator, or a Judge is un-
natural and absurd. 87 
The same precept is reflected hr the rhetoric of the North Caro-
lina statutes repealing the traditional inheritance laws and in the 
words of the lawyer who in 1788 sought to convince the Delaware 
Court of Errors and Appeals that his client's inheritance was in fee 
simple: "estates in fee tail are no favourites of the law, and particu-
larly ought not to be so, under republican forms of government, so 
that if there be any doubt in this case, determination should incline 
rather towards the appellants. "88 The fundamental notion was that, 
in a republic, careers should be based upon talent rather than 
status.80 
In evaluating the significance of the reform in inheritance law, 
86. Bailyn, Political Experience and Enlightenment Ideas in Eighteenth-Century 
America, 61 AM. HIST. REV. 339, 351 (1962). 
87. Mason's draft of the Declaration of Rights, May 20-26, 1776, in 1 G. MASON, 
THE PAPERS OF GEORGE MASON, 1725.J1792, at 277 (R. Rutland ed. 1970). 
88. Robinson v. Lessee of Adams, 4 Dall. xii, xiv (Del. 1788). 
89. For an unusually perceptive account of the problem of inherited authority in 
English political theory, see P. Lucas, supra note 2, at 195-264. 
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it is essential to keep in mind what the reform effort in America 
did not do. The Americans did not attempt to legislate equality. 
After all, the debate about revision of the law of intestate succession 
was only ·aboµt the necessity for equalizing the claims of children 
(or at least male children) to the estates of their parents. In France, 
as we have seen, equality was the primary objective of reform in 
the law of inheritance. The French revolutionaries went so far as 
to subordinate a property owner's testamentary desires to the policy 
of egalitarianism. In this country, however, the objective was more 
to destroy primogeniture and entail than to achieve equality among 
children. Designed to limit concentrations of landed property and 
to end the political dominance of a landed elite, American statutory 
reform removed devices of compulsory inequality, but stopped short 
of requiring equality. Egalitarianism was not the animus of the 
American Revolutio~, as indeed it could not have been in a society 
whose leadership included many proprietors of slave labor. 
The reform of inheritance law thus carried a symbolic impor-
tance disproportionate to the significance of its substantive implica-
tions. The attitudes toward inheritance delineate in a small way cer-
tain fundamental contours of American Revolutionary ideology. In 
the case of inheritance, Revolutionary theory encountered theoretical 
difficulties that it did not find elsewhere because the natqral rights 
tradition, which formed so large a part of the theory, so forthrightly 
proclaimed the right of inheritapce. As long as the Revolution went 
no further than reform, conceptual dissonance was avoided. But in 
altering the traditional practice of inheritance, Americans were 
increasingly drawn to the positivistic explications of the right (as, to 
be sure, their English and French contemporaries were). This 
positivism, combined with rigorous and logical republicanism, led 
Jefferson, Paine, and the French revolutionaries to more radical con-
clusions, but the moderation of the mainstream of thought in early 
America becomes apparent when contrasted with Jefferson's most 
ambitious proposals. The logic of revolution in America would sus-
tain neither an agrarian law nor the abolition of inheritance, al-
though obviously either would theoretically have helped create a 
purer republic. 
In 1775 Patrick Henry wrote: "I have but one lamp by which 
my feet are planted, and that is the lamp of experience. I know 
of no way of judging the future hut by the past."90 The American 
90. H. COLBOURN, THE LAMP OF EXPERIENCE xi (1965) (quoting Henry). 
November 1977] Law of Inheritance 29 
Revolutionary leaders were insistent upon the practical wisdom of 
history (of which the common law was an -important part), for it· 
demonstrated to them the virtues and true principles of republican-
ism. At the same time, they were pragmatists of the most remark-
able sort, who believed that they held their destiny in their own 
hands. History showed that primogeniture and entail were feudal 
remains that had no place in a republican scheme of things and that 
represented the dead hand of an aristocratic corporatism they re-
jected. They were believers in a scientific history-the study of the 
past to develop principles for present policy-but opponents of the 
tyranny of the past. For such men the anachronism of the law of 
inheritance was an appropriate and symbolically fortuitous focus for 
their efforts. But they also drew from history a .fear of violent 
change and a real concern for continuity, and they were reluctant 
to move too far and too quickly. In reforming inheritance, they ex-
cised the most egregious anachronisms without altering those funda-
mental principles that seemed ·suitable and even central to a society 
that on the whole they thoroughly admired. · 
